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The Status of Administrative Judges in the U.K.:
Recruitment, Tenure, Training and Appraisal*
Martin Partington**
INTRODUCTION
The "status" of administrative judges in the United Kingdom ("U.K.")
is a theme that has not received the direct attention that it deserves,
though it underpins in significant ways most of the ideas currently being
considered about how the administrative justice system in the U.K.
should develop. Although this paper is country-specific, I anticipate that
many of the issues raised here will be common to other jurisdictions. I
look forward to the interchange of ideas and experiences that will result
from the publication of this paper.
This paper has been revised following the publication of the Leggatt
Review of Tribunals ("Leggatt Review").' The purpose of the Leggatt
This is a revised version of a paper presented to the 2nd International Conference on Ad-
ministrative Justice, "In search of Universal Values in Administrative Justice," held in Que-
bec City, Canada in June 2001. CANADIAN COUNCIL OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS, at
http://www.ccat-ctac.org (last modified Aug. 2001) (The Canadian Council of Administra-
tive Tribunals organized the conference). I am most grateful to the editors of this Journal for
their assistance in putting my text into the appropriate style.
** Martin Partington is a Law Commissioner for England and Wales and a Professor of Law,
University of Bristol. Professor Partington founded the Bristol Centre for the Study of Ad-
ministrative Justice in 1993. Professor Partington was appointed as an expert consultant to
the Leggatt Review of Tribunals, whose report, Tribunals for Users, was published in Au-
gust 2001. At the Law Commission, Professor Partington leads a program of work on Hous-
ing and Administrative Justice. Professor Partington previously assisted with the training of
tribunal chairs and members, was a training adviser to the President of the (Social Security)
Tribunal Service, and was a member of both the Tribunals Committee of the Judicial Studies
Board and the Main Board. For six years, Professor Partington was a member of the Council
on Tribunals and also sat as a part-time social security tribunal chair for three years. He
writes here in a purely personal capacity. Martin Partington may be contacted at mar-
tin.partington@lawcommission.gsi.gov.uk.
1. SIR ANDREW LEGGAT-r, TRIBUNALS FOR USERS: ONE SYSTEM, ONE SERVICE (Mar.
2001), at http://www.tribunals-review.org.uk (last visited Jan. 28, 2002). Sir Andrew Leg-
gatt, a retired judge from the Court of Appeals, chaired the Review of Tribunals. The Report
of the Review was established in May, 2000 and asked to report by March 31, 2001. The
final copy was delivered to the Lord Chancellor on March 29, 2001 and it was published in
316 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 21-2
Review, the most far-reaching official review of the administrative jus-
tice system in Britain in over forty years, was to develop proposals for
rendering current institutional arrangements for the delivery of adminis-
trative justice in the U.K. more coherent. The British Government has
launched a public consultation exercise to explore the extent to which
the proposals made by Leggatt and his team should become Government
policy. 2 The timing of these matters demonstrates that the issues raised
in this paper are at the very top of the agenda relating to the institutional
development of administrative justice in the U.K.
This paper is divided into three parts. The first part briefly sketches
the development of administrative tribunals and how the issues of re-
cruitment, tenure, training and appraisal have been dealt with histori-
cally.3 The second part consists of a summary of the Leggatt Review's
likely comments regarding these issues.4 Finally, I will offer personal
observations about how the U.K.'s administrative law system may de-
velop in the future. 5 Although the paper is general in its analysis, many
of the examples are taken from the development of the U.K.'s social se-
curity adjudication - the largest single branch of the administrative jus-
tice system, and the aspect with which I am most familiar and have had
most involvement.
SECTION 1: HISTORY
Though administrative tribunals have been in existence for nearly one
hundred years, in the U.K. and other countries, they are still a relatively
new creation. The first administrative tribunals in the U.K. were estab-
lished in 1911.6 Initially, the tribunals were clearly seen as part of the
August, 2001.
2. SIR ANDREW LEGGATT, CONSULTATION PAPER ABOUT THIE REPORT OF THE REVIEW OF
TRIBUNALS (Aug. 2001), at http://www.lcd.gov.uk/consult/leggatt/leggatt.htm. (last visited
Jan. 28, 2002).
3. See infra Section 1.
4. See infra Section 2.
5. See infra Section 3.
6. This assertion is not wholly uncontroversial. The General Commissioners of Income
Tax, which hear appeals against the Taxing authorities, trace their origins back to the 18th
century. See generally Chantal Stebbings, Historical Factors In Contemporary Tribunal
Structure, in THE LEGGATT REVIEW OF TRIBUNALS: ACADEMIC SEMINAR PAPERS (Martin Part-
ington ed., Bristol 2001) (on file with author); Martin Partington, The Evolution of Adminis-
trative Justice in England: The Case of Social Security, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOUR
LAW: ESSAYS FOR PAUL O'HIGGINS (Ewing, KD, Gearty, CA, and Hepple, BA eds., Mansell
1994) (on file with author).
administrative arm of government. 7 They were established on a highly
fragmented basis, as individual governmental departments found them to
be desirable or necessary.
8
Five generalizations can be made regarding administrative tribunals
during this period:
" Recruitment and appointments to tribunals were made by the spon-
soring departments;9
* Tribunal membership was essentially a part-time occupation;
10
* No serious consideration was given to questions of job security;"
" There was no evidence of any training program for chairs and mem-
bers, save through learning by experience; 12 and
" There was no concept of formal performance appraisal.
13
Though the development of administrative tribunals was subject to
some sharp criticism and an official review in the late 1920s and early
1930s, 14 it was not until 1957, when the Franks Committee ("the Com-
mittee") issued its report, Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries ("the
Franks Committee Report"), that a clear view emerged. 15 According to
the Franks Committee Report, tribunals should not be seen as a part of
the administrative arm of Government, but rather, should be seen as part
of the adjudicative arm, with a proper sense of impartiality and inde-
pendence from Government. 
16
7. See, e.g., WILLIAM ANTHONY ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A
STUDY OF THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 89-90 (3d ed. 1951). In some countries - Australia is
the prime example - tribunals, at least at the national level, are still regarded as part of the
executive arm of government; this is a result of specific constitutional provisions which en-
shrine this status.
8. See id.
9. Id. at 68-69.
10. Id. at 43.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See generally LORD GORDAN HEWART, THE NEW DESPOTISM (Cosmopolitan Book
Corp. 1929) (1929) (on file with author).
15. COMMITrEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS & ENQUIRIES, REPORT, 1957, Cmnd.
218 [hereinafter FRANKS COMMITTEE REPORT] (on file with author).
16. Id.; see also generally JOSEPH M. JACOB, THE REPUBLICAN CROWN (Aldershot
1996) (describing a fascinating account of the background of the Franks Committee Report)
(on file with author). As was noted in discussions in Canada, one of the advantages of the
(unwritten) British Constitution is that a decision to reconceptualize tribunals as part of the
adjudicative rather than as part of the administrative branch of government is easier to
achieve than in countries with written constitutions, where the boundaries of the adjudicative
branch are more firmly set.
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In relation to the matters being considered in this paper, the Commit-
tee made a number of significant points, though there were also signifi-
cant omissions.
Recruitment and Appointments
First, the Committee noted that the bulk of the adjudicative personnel
of tribunals (for example, chairs and members) were at that time being
appointed by the sponsoring government departments, against whose
decisions appeals were being made. 17 The Committee regarded this as
objectionable in principle, particularly in cases where the department
concerned was an interested party to the tribunal proceeding. 18
To address the problem, the Committee received strong representa-
tions that the appointment of all chairs and members of tribunals should
be made by the Lord Chancellor. 19 In the alternative, it was argued that
if the Lord Chancellor appointed members as well as chairs, too great a
burden would be imposed on his department.20
The Committee recommended that the powers of appointment by the
Lord Chancellor be limited to chairs.2 1 In relation to the tribunal mem-
bers, the Committee recommended that they no longer be appointed by
the heads of the government departments, but rather, should be ap-
pointed by a proposed Council on Tribunals ("Council"). 22
In terms of the qualifications of chairs and members, the Committee
suggested that chairs should be legally qualified, while also explaining
that others not legally qualified should not be ruled out where otherwise
suitable. The Committee felt the quality of members was "on the whole
satisfactory," 23 and the Committee had "no general proposals to make
with regard to their qualifications." 24 However, the Committee said that
the quality of the Appellate Tribunals' members should be higher than
those in the first instant tribunals. 25
The Committee did not have anything specific to say about the proc-
esses that should be adopted for recruitment. The public advertising of
17. FRANKS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 15.
18. Id. at 45.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. Id. at 46-49.
23. However, the basis of this assertion was not derived from any research. Id. at 56.
24. Id. at 58.
25. Id.
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candidates for appointment, which is now an accepted part of the re-
cruitment and appointment process, was not on the Committee's list of
issues.
Tenure
On the question of tenure security, it is clear from their report that the
Committee assumed that existing appointments were temporary.
26 In-
deed, the Committee's approval is reflected in the following statement:
"We are agreed in rejecting any suggestion that in general, tribunal ser-
vice should become whole time or salaried... We believe that public
spirited citizens will continue to serve without remuneration on many
tribunals .... "27 The Committee argued that if removal of either a tri-
bunal chair or a member became necessary during the time of his or her
tenure in a particular tribunal, the matter should be undertaken by the
Lord Chancellor.28 However, where an existing chairman or member
has been appointed by a minister other than the Lord Chancellor, re-
moval would take place by that minister.
29
Training and Appraisal
One of the great paradoxes of the Franks Committee Report, when
read with modem eyes, is that is that the tribunals claimed to have a
great advantage over the courts because they had expertise in the subject
matter of the dispute, despite the lack of consideration as to how that ex-
pertise might be acquired. 30 In other words, there was no consideration
of how chairs and members might or should be trained for the tasks they
were required to perform.31 According to the Franks Committee Report,
chairs and members would be qualified in one of three ways. 32 First,
they may bring pre-existing knowledge of the relevant law to the tribu-
nal room.33 Second, and more likely, they may pick up the particular
area of law under discussion either by osmosis or by trial and error.
34
26. See id.
27. Id. at 57.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
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Finally, they may rely on guidance from departmental officials. 35 Per-
haps they could utilize a combination of all three. Today, the omission
of any mention of training seems both bizarre and incredible, but evi-
dently not thought necessary then. 36 Similarly, there was no mention of
the possibility that the performance of tribunal chairs and members
should in any way be formally appraised. 37 Though the basic Franksian
principles of openness, fairness and impartiality became a kind of man-
tra and helped to shape developments in the administrative justice sys-
tem over the next forty years, many of the detailed Franks Committee
Report recommendations remained unimplemented. In the present con-
text, the most notable non-development is related to the appointment of
members, which remains a departmental responsibility.38
It is perhaps fair to say, however, that the Committee began to raise
some expectations about how tribunals should operate. 39 In particular,
the Committee inspired the creation of the Council on Tribunals in 1959,
which was an important first step.40 Once the Council began examining
the tribunals' operation, they began to identify and rectify the failures
found in the system.41 Although the Council has not been as effective as
some might have liked, it has had a significant "behind-the-scenes" in-
fluence. The Council has also been successful in drawing attention to
problems associated with tribunals, many of which are discussed in this
paper, and helped shape opinion on them.42
During the 1960s and early 1970s, tribunals faced increasingly stri-
dent public criticism, particularly those tribunals dealing with social se-
35. See id.
36. See id. (There has of course been a revolution in attitudes toward questions regard-
ing professional education and development in the interim.).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See generally MARTIN PARTINGTON ET AL., COUNCIL ON TRIBUNALS ANNUAL RE-
PORTS: ANNOTATED INDEX, 1959-1993 (Univ. of Bristol 1994) (providing a summary of
Council on Tribunals Annual Reports and an analysis of their contents) (on file with author);
see also COUNCIL ON TRIBUNALS ANNUAL REPORTS, available at http://www.council-on-
tribunals.gov.uk/annual.htm (last modified June 8, 2001) (providing the latest annual re-
ports).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. The Leggatt Review is likely to propose new means of enabling the Council to be
sharper in its comments. The Council itself sees a need for this and has adopted a "Change
Programme." 1999-2000 COUNCIL ON TRIBUNALS ANN. REP. 1, 2-4, available at http://
www.council-on-tribunals.gov.uk/annualreports/00/00index.htm (last modified June 8,
2001).
curity matters.43 Much of this was linked to the rise of the Welfare
Rights movement in the U.K.4 4 Taking social security tribunals as a
case study, tribunals were attacked for their perceived lack of "inde-
pendence" and the fact that very basic legal principles (for example,
that the discretionary policies of government departments were not le-
gally binding on appeal tribunals) were not understood, let alone ap-
plied, in the tribunal hearing due to lack of adequate training.
45
The Department of Health and Social Security ("DHSS") responded
to these criticisms by commissioning two independent research pro-
grams conducted by Professor Kathleen Bell.46  Bell concluded that
while National Insurance Local Tribunals, which were chaired by part-
time lawyers, were functioning more or less satisfactorily, Supplemen-
tary Benefits Appeal Tribunals chaired by lay people, were not.
47
These criticisms led the DHSS to take the following steps:
9 First, it funded a basic training program in 1977 and 1978 (organized
by Professor A. W. Bradley, then of the University of Edinburgh) tar-
geted at lay people (for example, not legally trained) who were then
chairs of the Supplementary Benefits Appeal Tribunal.48 Thus, from
an early stage, training was seen as a key aspect in the enhancement
of quality;
43. Id.
44. See generally MELVIN HERMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND SUPPLEMENTARY
BENEFITS, OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON SOCIAL ADMINISTRATION NO. 47 (London 1972) (on file
with author); see also RUTH LISTER, JUSTICE FOR THE CLAIMANT: A STUDY OF SUPPLEMEN-
TARY BENEFIT APPEAL TRIBUNALS 1 (Child Poverty Action Group 1974). This movement
was inspired by developments in the United States.
45. 1999-2000 COUNCIL ON TRIBUNALS ANN. REP. 1, available at http://www.council-
on-tribunals.gov.uk/annualreports/00/00index.htm (last modified June 8, 2001).
46. Kathleen Bell et al., National Insurance Local Tribunals, 3 J. Soc. POL'Y 292
(1974) (on file with author); see also Kathleen Bell, Research Study on Supplementary Bene-
fit Appeal Tribunals, 4 J. Soc. POL'Y 1 (1975).
47. See generally MARTIN PARTINGTON AND MONICA FLETCHER, UNITED KINGDOM, IN-
TERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS: SOCIAL SECURITY (2d. 2000) (on file with author).
The distinction between National Insurance Benefits and Supplementary Benefits is not an
easy one to explain. Broadly, National Insurance Benefits derive from a National Insurance
Fund into which people make (compulsory) payments. Supplementary Benefits are funded
from General Taxation and are designed to provide a minimum level of welfare benefit be-
low which people should not be allowed to fall. Entitlement to benefits, such as sickness
benefits, in the former scheme were much more closely defined in legal rules than the much
more discretionary Supplementary Benefit scheme. The detailed nomenclature has now
changed greatly.
48. Martin Partington, The Restructuring of Social Security Appeal Tribunals: A Per-
sonal View, in PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICS 169 (Carol Harlow ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1986)
(providing additional comments on these developments).
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9 Second, in 1980, the first step towards a more professional judicial
management structure occurred with the appointment of four full-
time "Senior Chairmen" who began to work together to devise ways
of improving the role of the social security tribunals. 49 Most impor-
tantly for the purpose of this paper, the Senior Chairmen began to
take active steps to attract new candidates for appointment to the tri-
bunal systems. 50 Though they did not at that stage invite candidates
to become chairmen and members by public advertisement, they did
go out of their way to bring in persons who, under the former prac-
tices adopted for recruitment by the DHSS, would not have been ap-
pointed to the tribunal.51
These developments were taken significantly further in 1983, when
the Health and Social Services and Social Security Adjudication Act
(HASSASSA) passed. 52 This act accomplished three things. First, it
merged the two separate tribunal systems into a single system.53 Sec-
ond, it created a new full-time post of President to lead the tribunal sys-
tem.54 Third, it placed on the President a statutory obligation to provide
training for both chairs and members.
55
The President developed a regional structure, with each region headed
by a Regional Chairman. 56 One of the most important tasks for the Re-
gional Chairman was to further develop their procedures for identifying
suitable candidates for chairman and membership appointment. 57 From
the outset, they became increasingly willing to appoint independent-
minded people, many of whom had experience in assisting claimants, or
who, like myself, had an academic interest in the subject.58 Thus, they
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 170.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 171.
55. Id. at 176.
56. Julian Fulbrook, HASSASSA and Judge Byrt - 5 Years On, 18 INDus. L. J. 177(1989) (providing a note of appreciation) (on file with author). The first president was HH
Judge John Byrt QC - a quite remarkable man of vision for this key appointment in the tri-
bunal system.
57. Partington, supra note 48, at 177.
58. One of the interesting side issues that this raises is that, although academic
achievement and distinction is not, on its own, currently seen as a proper basis for appoint-
ment to the judicial bench - unlike the situation in many other countries, there is a consider-
able number of law professors and other legal academics who sit in tribunals - not just social
security, but more broadly.
understood the law, but were also committed to the even-handed appli-
cation of the law.
Training was a key responsibility for the President.59 He delegated
this to one of his Regional Chairmen who was further assisted by a train-
ing advisory group. 60 From an early stage, they sought to move away
from a simple diet of lectures, the preferred format, towards the more ef-
fective though expensive use of small group work.61 For example, they
used video films, though they were not always successful. 62 Most im-
portantly, they pioneered attempts to introduce training in the interper-
sonal skills needed by chairpersons to run their tribunals successfully. 63
There have been further significant changes since then. One change,
which has occurred in a number of tribunal systems, 64 has been the
marked shift from an almost total reliance on part-time chairpersons to
the establishment of a substantial cadre of full-timers. 65 They have been
justified both in terms of their enhanced judicial efficiency, as well as
their role in the training and appraisal of part-time adjudicators. 66
In addition, there has been a further restructuring of the whole social
security appeals service, designed to improve efficiency in service deliv-
ery.67 These developments include the following: training in the law
and in interpersonal skills to improve judicial performance; the appraisal
of that performance; systems mergers to enhance efficiency; the ap-
pointment of the President to provide judicial leadership; and the role of
Regional Chairs and other full-time chairs to support these initiatives.
These developments can all be seen as a process of professionalization
of the social security tribunal system that has occurred over the last fif-
teen years.6
8
59. Partington, supra note 48, at 176-77.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Notably Employment Tribunals, and Immigration Adjudication.
65. Partington, supra note 48, at 177.
66. Id. at 176-77
67. Social Security Act, 1998, Eliz., c.14 (Eng.); see also Nick Wikeley, Burying Bell:
Managing the Judicialisation of Social Security Tribunals, 63 MOD. L. REV. 475 (2000) (re-
viewing these developments) (on file with author).
68. Another development, not mentioned here, is the development of Users Groups to
improve communication with client groups and the accountability of the tribunal system to
users.
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A similar story of professionalization not developed here can also be
told in relation to the Employment Tribunal System, the other major
player in the tribunal world.69 One may also tell an equally impressive
story relating to the development of the Planning Inspectorate who,
though they hold inquiries, are effectively tribunals in all but name.
70
Other tribunal systems began to follow suit, some more reluctantly than
others. Particular examples include the Mental Health Review Tribunal,
where a number of chairs and members took matters into their own
hands and began to organize induction training, and Immigration Adju-
dicators, who moved into this area at the insistence of one or two indi-
viduals in the early days, even in the face of opposition from the Chief
Adjudicator at the time.
During this period, the Council expressed concerns about standards,
particularly those related to training, that became increasingly heard.7 1
Many of these were discussed in the Council's special report regarding
the independence of tribunals which was published in 1997.72
At this time, there were three other major institutional developments
that must be mentioned. One of these developments was the reformation
and expansion of the roles of the Judicial Studies Board ("JSB"). 73 The
JSB first established its Tribunals Committee in 1988 and gradually
thereafter began to include training for tribunals within the scope of its
activities. The JSB also began to publish a journal entitled "Tribunals"
on a bi-annual basis to discuss issues relating to tribunal practices and
procedures. 74
The Tribunals Committee delivered some important achievements in
its over ten years of existence. First, it raised awareness regarding the
69. Arguably the employment tribunal is not a "true" administrative tribunal in that it
does not deal with citizen and state issues, but party and party employment disputes. Never-
theless, they do share many of the characteristics of tribunals.
70. See, e.g., Chris Shepley, Recruitment, Training and the Monitoring of Quality in
the Planning Inspectorate, in ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 417 (Michael
Harris and Martin Partington eds., Hart Publishing 1999).
71. Tribunals: The Organisation and Independence, 1997, Cm. 3744, reprinted in
1996-1997 COUNCIL ON TRIBUNALS ANN. REP. 1, at Appendix A, available at
http://www.council-on-tribunals.gov.uklannualreports/97/appa.htm (last modified June 8,
2001).
72. Id.
73. Martin Partington, Training the Judiciary in England and Wales: The Work of the
Judicial Studies Board, CIVIL JUST. Q. 319-36 (1994) (on file with author); see also JUDICIAL
STUDIES BOARD, at http://www.jsboard.co.uk (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) (providing addi-
tional information on the work of the Judicial Studies Board).
74. Partington, supra note 73.
importance of training throughout the tribunal community.75 When it
first started its work, many tribunal systems in existence either provided
no training whatsoever (and were happy to assert that they it wasn't nec-
essary) or offered only limited training.76 Today, however, newly ap-
pointed chairs and members expect to receive not only initial training,
but are given ongoing training as well, due in large part to the influence
of the Tribunals Committee.
77
Second, the Tribunals Committee accepted, not without controversy,
the need to provide training in interpersonal and judicial skills as wells
as training in the law.78 Although the JSB decided it had to offer "ge-
neric" courses of assistance to all tribunals, it refused to offer courses in
specific areas of substantive law, and instead chose to focus on issues
that related to the quality of a hearing. 79
There were, however, limits to the ability of the JSB to provide train-
ing for tribunals. For example:
" First, the JSB lacked the cash resources. 80 The primary responsibility
of the JSB is to train the judges that sit on the ordinary criminal and
civil courts. 81  Therefore, after completing its primary task, there
were few resources available for tribunals.8
2
* Second, and a more technically difficulty, is that the JSB is spon-
sored by the Lord Chancellor's Department ("LCD").83 The effect is
that the JSB only receives direct funding to enable it to deliver
courses for tribunal systems that are run by the LCD.84 Although at
the beginning of the Tribunals Committee's work, those sponsored
by the LCD were few in number, the amount significantly increased
throughout the 1990s.85 Tribunal chairs sponsored by other depart-
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The general change in attitudes towards Continuing Professional Development
contributed as well.
78. Id.
79. Id. This was important, given the fact that legal aid was not on the whole available
for legal representation of parties appearing before tribunals. It was important that the tribu-
nal was able to "enable" the un-represented party before it to present his or her case fully and
fairly. But cf HAZEL GENN AND YVETrE GENN, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION AT
TRIBUNALS (London 1989) (providing criticism of this position) (on file with author).
80. See generally Partington, supra note 73.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. This was particularly true when responsibility for General Commissioners for
Fall 2001 The Status of Administrative Judges in the U.K.
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ments therefore had to be funded by those departments; however, the
funding was not always forthcoming, as had been hoped.
86
* Third, even when the resources for training were available, only tri-
bunal chairs were able to attend because the courses were not offered
to other tribunal members.8
7
The second institutional change of great importance occurred after
years of neglect and indifference, when the LCD began to take over ad-
ministration of some important tribunal systems.88 In addition, it slowly
began developing policy in relation to tribunals. 89 The high point of this
new attitude was the establishment of the Leggatt Review, 90 noted above
and discussed below.
The Lord Chancellor's Department also began to adopt different ap-
proaches to recruitment in particular with regard to the appointment of
chairs of tribunals.9 1 Recruitment is now performed through public ad-
vertisement rather than the use of informal procedures undertaken "be-
hind the scenes." 9
2
Third, the enactment of the Human Rights Act of 1998 drew new at-
tention to the importance of ensuring that the resolution of civil disputes
conformed to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Article 6 provides that "everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal estab-
lished by law." 93 This provision had an immediate impact on a decision
of the Scottish Court of Session, which raised questions about the impar-
tiality of part-time judges where confirmation of appointment was de-
pendent on a particular Minister's approval. 94 A new set of rules was
Income Tax was transferred to the LCD.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See generally Michael Harris and Martin Partington, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN
THE 21ST CENTURY (Michael Harris and Martin Partington eds., Hart Publishing 1999). It
was the LCD that invested in the International Conference on Administrative Justice held in
Bristol, England, in November 1997.
90. Leggatt, supra note 2.
91. See generally SIR LEONARD PEACH, INDEPENDENT SCRUTINY OF THE APPOINTMENT
PROCESSES OF JUDGES AND QUEEN'S COUNSEL (Dec. 1999) (reporting on and giving recom-
mendations for the judicial appointments system), available at http://www.lcd.gov.uk/jud-
icial/peach/indexfr.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2002).
92. Id.
93. Human Rights Act, 1998, Eliz., c. 42, art. 6, sched. 1 (Eng.).
94. Starrs and Chalmers v Procurator Fiscal [2000] SCOTS LAW TIMES 42 (on file with
author).
introduced to ensure that part-time judges are only removed for misbe-
havior or failure to observe the standards expected of the office.
95
SECTION 2: THE LEGGATr REVIEW OF TRIBUNALS
Notwithstanding all these developments, and an increasing recogni-
tion that tribunals are far more likely than the ordinary courts to be the
body which determines legal cases affecting the individual, tribunals are
still frequently perceived as "second class courts," or bodies in some
sense inferior to the courts, rather than first class tribunals which have
an important and distinct role to play in the English legal system.96 A
prime objective of Sir Andrew Leggatt in his Review of Tribunals was to
change this perception, particularly among lawyers who have little or no
experience in tribunals, since there is no funding to encourage them to
take these cases to tribunals. His aim was to produce recommendations
for a new Tribunals System of which all those who worked in it could be
proud.97
The Leggatt Review has made a substantial number of detailed rec-
ommendations about how the tribunal world should develop. At the
heart of his proposals, however, are some key issues about the shape and
structure of administrative justice in England and Wales. If adopted,
Leggatt's proposals will affect major changes to the status of administra-
tive judges in the U.K.
Leggatt began by recounting that, in the forty-four years since tribu-
nals were last reviewed, their numbers had increased considerably and
their work had become much more complex.98 Together they constitute
a substantial part of the system of justice in England and Wales. Never-
theless, Leggatt argued that too often their methods are old-fashioned
and daunting to users. In addition, their training and information tech-
nology are under-resourced. 99 Because there are many and disparate tri-
bunals, there is a considerable waste of resources in managing them, and
95. 1999-2000 JuD. APPOINTMENTS ANN. REP. §§ 2.14-.18 (2000), available at
http://www.lcd.gov.uk/judicial/ja.arep2000/judapp.pdf (last modified Oct. 2000); see also
Carol Harlow, The ECHR and Administrative Justice, in THE LEGGATT REVIEW OF TRIBU-
NALS: ACADEMIC SEMINAR PAPERS (Martin Partington ed., 2001) (on file with author).
96. Martin Partington, Lessons from Tribunals, in SHAPING THE FUTURE: NEW DIREC-
TIONS IN LEGAL SERVICES 246-56 (Roger Smith ed., Legal Action Group 1995) (on file with
author).
97. Leggatt, supra note 2.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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they achieve no economies of scale.' 00 Most importantly, they are not
independent of the departments that sponsor them.
10 1
The Franks Committee argued that tribunals should be independent,
accessible, prompt, expert, informal, and cheap. 10 2 The most important
of these qualities is independence. Today, the only evidence of inde-
pendence lay in the LCD's administration of twelve of the more impor-
tant tribunals. 10 3 Otherwise, a department of State may provide the ad-
ministrative support for a tribunal, promote the legislation prescribing
the procedures which it is to follow, and pay the fees and expenses of
panel members. The tribunal was independent in neither appearance nor
fact in these circumstances. 10 4 Such a relationship may have become
vulnerable to challenge under the Human Rights legislation. 10 5 In any
event, the fact that tribunals appeared to be subject to their sponsoring
departments did not aid the administration of justice. For users, "every
appeal is an away game."' 10 6
Leggatt argued that the only way to achieve independence and coher-
ence is to have all the tribunals supported by a single Tribunals Ser-
vice. 10 7 For example, Leggatt suggested the creation of a common ad-
ministrative service answerable to the Lord Chancellor, analogous with
but separate from the Courts Service. 10 8 To do this would raise their
status, while preserving their distinctness from the courts. 109
Of course, Leggatt was not concerned exclusively, or even primarily,
with the question of status. He was focused more on the efficiency of a
system of justice that affects so many individual citizens. In the medium
term, Leggatt suggested the reforms would:
yield considerable economies of scale, particularly in re-
lation to the provision of premises for all tribunals,
common basic training, and the use of [information
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. FRANKS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 15.
103. Most of which had only recently been taken over by the LCD. See supra notes
86-95.
104. Leggatt, supra note 2.
105. Human Rights Act, 1998, Eliz., c. 42, art. 6, sched. 1 (Eng.)
106. Leggatt, supra note 2.
107. Id.
108. Id. The Courts Service is the Agency responsible for the administration of the
civil courts and the principal criminal courts in England and Wales. There are separate courts
systems in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
109. Id.
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technology]. It would also bring greater administrative
efficiency, a single point of contact for users;... a better
relationship between members and administrative staff,
improved career patterns for both, common standards,
greater prospects of job satisfaction, an enhanced corpo-
rate image, and improved geographical distribution of
tribunal centres. It should be committed by [a new Con-
sumers'] Charter to provide a high quality, unified ser-
vice, to operate independently, to deal openly and hon-
estly with users of tribunals, to seek to maintain public
confidence, and to report annually on its performance. 1 10
The key aim was to provide a system in which users are able to repre-
sent themselves, not one obsessed by throughput targets.111 Many of the
detailed suggestions relate to status issues, which are considered in the
next section.
Status
In Leggatt's view, the Tribunals System should be headed by a Senior
President, who should be a High Court judge sitting in one of the appel-
late tribunals. 112 Presidents should also be judges, or at least be of judi-
cial status, though not necessarily all from the Courts Service.113 Each
President would be in charge of one or more divisions. 114 "It should be
the task of the Presidents to promote, by leadership and coordination,
both consistency of decision-making and uniformity of practice and pro-
cedure throughout their respective areas of responsibility." 115 They
should also have regular meetings with departments to help them im-
prove their decision-making process. 116 All too often, those who sit in
tribunals see themselves, and are regarded by others, as inferior to the
courts. To enhance their standing, as well as their self-esteem, Leggatt
suggests that full-time chairmen should from time to time be appointed
as Division Presidents, and so as circuit judges. 117 In addition, those
Division Presidents who have shown themselves worthy of high judicial
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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office should be given consideration for the appointment to the High
Court of circuit judges. 118
Notwithstanding these points, Leggatt was not persuaded by argu-
ments that tribunal chairs should henceforth be titled "judges" as some
had argued. To do this, in Leggatt's view, would send the wrong mes-
sage - that tribunals needed to be thought of from the perspective of the
court system rather than being a distinct service in its own right.119 In
this sense, Leggatt saw the value in developing some notion of a "career
progression" for successful tribunal chairs. This could well assist in the
recruitment of appropriate people to the administrative justice judiciary.
Training
The prime necessity in Leggatt's view, is "for improved training in
the interpersonal skills peculiar to tribunals." 120 This issue was at the
heart of the Leggatt vision that tribunals should be a forum where appel-
lants could represent themselves, and where a "user-focus" was para-
mount. It would be a mistake to suppose that such skills could all be ac-
quired simply by experience. Rather they "should be [acquired] by a
competency based approach to the training of chairmen and mem-
bers." 121 This position is also supported by the JSB. To ensure that
standards of the provision are maintained, it is essential to have national
training co-ordination, which would be easier to arrange when all groups
of tribunals have a president or deputy president. 122 Each should ap-
point a national training officer, and set a training budget. 123 The skills
required for the efficient conduct of a tribunal should be imparted by
means of introductory training in core competences, followed by con-
tinuation training. 124 Training should also be provided in the additional
competences needed by chairmen, especially those needed to help them
overcome the communication, language and literacy difficulties experi-
enced by some users. 125 Specialist knowledge required by the members
118. Id.
119. Id. Nevertheless, there may need to be more public recognition of the work of
those who sit in tribunals than is presently the case. Currently the judiciary receive a number
of perks and benefits denied to their tribunal colleagues.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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of some tribunals should be provided in-house.
126
One of Leggatt's fundamental recommendations is that a serious in-
jection of resources should be provided as soon as possible to the JSB to
enable it to begin the expanded program of training seen as the key to
the successful development of administrative justice in the U.K. 127
Appraisal
All chairmen and members should participate in an annual review of
their performance while sitting on a tribunal. 128 They "should also have
the benefit of a tribunal handbook and training newsletters." 129 The
purpose of this was not to challenge the independence of their decision
taking. The focus would be on the question of how they ran their tribu-
nals, and whether they were achieving the fundamental objective of ap-
propriate levels of service to the tribunal user.
Recruitment and security
Since appointment systems currently vary, Leggatt argues they are
therefore vulnerable to challenge under the Human Rights Act. 130 He
suggests that, like part-time judicial appointments, all part-time tribunal
appointments should be made by the Lord Chancellor, and "should be
for a renewable period of five or seven years. Subject to age, renewal
for further such periods would be automatic, unless [defined] grounds
for non-renewal" are established. 131 These grounds "would include
misbehaviour, incapacity, and failure to comply with sitting and training
requirements." 132 The Lord Chancellor would prescribe similar grounds
for removal with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice. "There
should be an upper age limit of [seventy]" because any other limit would
"exclude many experts who are less readily available" before they re-
tire. 133 "Members should be assured not of a minimum number of sit-
ting days but of a fair share of the sitting days available to the members
of their own tribunal. Those who are qualified to sit as chairmen or as
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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members in one tribunal should be entitled to become qualified to sit...
in other associated tribunals," thereby improving flexibility in the use of
adjudicator power, as well as enable chairmen to be offered new chal-
lenges and new contexts within which to work. 134
Leggatt argues that there is no justification for members, whether ex-
pert or lay, to sit on a tribunal unless they had a particular function to
fulfill. 135 Thus, the President should have discretion as to whether or
not lay members should sit in any particular case or category of cases.1 36
By limiting the number of lay members on a tribunal, the President may
more providently allocate resources to train those members who re-
main. 137 Those lay members who remain on the tribunal should be af-
forded instruction "in the process of finding facts, and in particular in
the weighing and evaluation of evidence." 138 Use of expert members
would continue much as before. 139
Tribunals and the Courts
One of the issues underpinning the review of tribunals was the inter-
face between the work of tribunals and the courts. If tribunals were not
up to the tasks they were required to perform, or if there were gaps in the
structure of tribunals, this could lead to additional work in the courts,
particularly judicial review, which was wasteful of resources. One of
the key parts of the Tribunal Service that Leggatt proposed, therefore,
was a strengthened appellate level which, Leggatt hoped, would remove
the need for a large number of judicial review cases to be brought to the
Administrative Court. 140 Instead, he wanted to see a more rational
structure for appeals made to the courts, usually to the Court of Appeal,
where there was a point of law to be resolved. 141
SECTION 3: FuTuRE DEVELOPMENTS
Given the particular moment in history when this paper is being pre-
pared and delivered, it is particularly difficult to anticipate what the final
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
outcome of the process will be.
The re-election of the Labour Government following the June 2001
General Election and the re-appointment of Lord Irvine as Lord Chan-
cellor after he was involved in setting up the Leggatt Review in the first
place might lead one to think that Leggatt's proposals will have a fair
chance of being brought into effect. However, the change in the ma-
chinery of government that will be required will be a substantial one and
will need great determination to pursue. Given that reform of adminis-
trative justice is not an issue, like education or health, which grabs the
media headlines, there will need to be continuing and firm support for
the proposals within the Government.
The need for this degree of support is that the implications of the Leg-
gatt Review are quite substantial in terms of institutional change, which
many (Civil Service) Heads of Ministries may well try to resist. Of
course it can be argued that the harder they resist (on the basis that they
should control tribunals whose activities they sponsor) the more they
prove the Leggatt argument (that too many tribunals are not sufficiently
independent of their sponsoring departments). But this cannot disguise
the fact that there will be some pretty bloody "turf wars" to be fought
and resolved. 142
A further difficulty in predicting the final outcome is the simple fact
that, even if the Government decides that it should proceed with the pro-
gram suggested by Leggatt, it will not happen overnight. It will have to
be managed incrementally, with full implementation taking a number of
years. The nature and detail of any program of change may itself be al-
tered in cases where implementation is so drawn out.
In conclusion, four specific points should be made:
First, Leggatt has proposed that the Council on Tribunals' role should
be enhanced. For example, Leggatt's focus on tribunal users suggests
that the Council should meet with representatives of user groups to edu-
cate itself about how specific parts of the tribunals system are develop-
ing.143 The Council should not only report to the Lord Chancellor, but
should also report to a Select Committee of the House of Commons, as
does the Parliamentary Ombudsman. Administrative justice is about the
quality of decision making in Government. Members of Parliament
142. Id. The tone of the Consultation Paper issued by the Government at the time the
Review was published seems designed to bring out into the open the tensions within the ma-
chinery of government about whether or not the Leggatt agenda should be taken forward.
143. See id.
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should be encouraged to take a greater interest in the Council's work,
thereby enhancing the professionalism of the tribunal service. The
Council, particularly under its new Chairman, is anxious to take on these
new responsibilities. I predict that whatever happens to the overall
scheme, a Council with a bit more "edge" than it had in the past will
emerge.
Second, international influences and experience should be considered.
The conference at which this paper was originally presented is a clear
example of how discussion about administrative justice and the princi-
ples on which administrative justice systems should be founded is be-
coming international. It cannot be said that the present system of tribu-
nals in the U.K. is satisfactory. It needs reform. Examples from
overseas will give those who can see the need for such reform further
ammunition to use against those who may wish to resist change.
Third, there is a slowly developing U.K. jurisprudence arising from
the enactment of the Human Rights Act of 1998. In particular, Article 6
(mentioned above) is likely to have some continuing impact on the de-
velopment of the administrative justice system in the U.K., even though
this may not be as dramatic an impact as some would like. 144 What is
essential, in my opinion, is that court rulings do not impose a straitjacket
on procedural and institutional innovation in the administrative justice
system. The system has evolved over the last century; there is no reason
to think it has reached some ideal state. There must be room for contin-
ued development and experimentation. (The potential impact of infor-
mation technology on the hearing process is just one obvious issue that
will come increasingly to the fore in the years ahead; these will be
thwarted by rulings that "hearings" can only take place with all the par-
ties physically present before an administrative judge.)
Finally, I would like to think that there are lessons for the Courts Ser-
vice145 and the way the Courts operate which might arise from reform of
the operation of tribunals, were the Leggatt proposals to be adopted.
144. A dramatic challenge to the legality of the British Planning Inquiry System, based
on the provisions of the Human Rights Act, has been resolved by the House of Lords in R v
Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions Ex p Holding and Barnes
Plc; R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions Ex p Alconbury
Developments Limited; R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Re-
gions Ex p Legal & General Assurance Society Limited on 9 May 2001 [2001] U.K.HL 23
(on file with author).
145. Much of the philosophy underlying the Consultation Paper Modernising the Civil
Courts published by the LCD in January 2001 is very similar to that of Leggatt, though there
is no mention of the latter in the former.
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While the distinction between courts and tribunals has in the past been
very marked, there are changes of culture occurring in the courts as well.
Greater understanding of the work that is undertaken by the administra-
tive judiciary in tribunals will, in my view, add to discussion about the
way in which the courts - particularly civil courts - should be develop-
ing.
